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Seino v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (2005)1
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS—INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE
Summary
This case was an appeal from a district court order denying Plaintiff/Appellant’s petition
for judicial review in a workers’ compensation case.
Disposition/Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order.
Factual and Procedural History
In January 2000, Plaintiff/Appellant Sandra Seino (“Seino”) alleged that chemicals
burned her hands during her course of employment. In March 2000, Seino filed a claim for
workers’ compensation with Defendant/Respondent Employers Insurance Company of Nevada
(“EICN”).
On March 22, 2000, EICN sent a letter to Seino denying her claims. The letter instructed
Seino that she had seventy days from the date of the letter to appeal the decision. Two days
later, Seino mailed the requisite appeal form to the hearings division, as the letter instructed.
However, the hearings division never received Seino’s letter. On November 9, 2000, Seino
faxed the appeal form to the hearings division.
After the hearings division received Seino’s faxed appeal form, it held a hearing on
Seino’s claims. The hearing officer, however, dismissed Seino’s claims as untimely under Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 616C.315(3) because the hearings division did not receive the appeals form within
seventy days.
Seino petitioned for judicial review in the district court, which the district court denied.
Seino then appealed the district court’s order.
Discussion
I.

The Jurisdictional Limits of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616C.315

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616C.315 provides that “Any person who is subject to the jurisdiction
of the hearing officers pursuant to chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS may
request a hearing before a hearing officer of any matter within the hearing officer's authority . . .
by filing a request for a hearing before a hearing officer. Such a request must include the
information required pursuant to subsection 2 and must be filed within 70 days after the date on
which the notice of the insurer's determination was mailed by the insurer or the unanswered
written request was mailed to the insurer, as applicable.”2 Additionally, the Nevada Supreme
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NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.315 (2004)(emphasis added).

Court has held, in SIIS v. Partlow-Hursh,3 that notice of appeal under the statute is filed when the
hearings division receives the notice, not when the appellant mails the notice. The court also
held in Partlow-Hursh, that the seventy-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure
to file a notice of appeal within the time limit is only excused if the appellant did not receive a
denial notice notifying the appellant of his or her appellate rights.
Seino argued, however, that the Court should revisit its holding in Partlow-Hursh.
Specifically, Seino argued that notice of appeal under § 616C.315 should be considered filed
when mailed, not when received. Seino cited Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a) as
authority, which provides that filings are timely when mailed, not when received by the court
clerk.
The Court ruled that Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a) is not analogous to the
filing requirements of § 616C.315. Accordingly, the Court refused to overturn its decision in
Partlow-Hursh, and found that Seino’s filing was untimely because the hearings division
received Seino’s notice well after the seventy-day time limit had expired.
II.

Unique Circumstances

The “unique circumstances” doctrine applies when “a party has performed an act which,
if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific
assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.”4 Seino argued that the
unique circumstances doctrine applied in her case because the denial letter she received from
EICN stated that, by failing to file a notice of appeal within seventy days, Seino may forfeit her
right to appeal. Seino suggested that the use of the word “may” rendered the notice provision
inadequate. The Court disagreed. The Court further noted that Seino never received specific
assurance from a judicial officer that she had filed her notice properly. Accordingly, the Court
refused to apply the doctrine of unique circumstances.
III.

Equitable Tolling

Seino argued that the time limit to file notice of appeal should be tolled under the
doctrine of equitable tolling. The Court refused to do so, however, because the Court has never
applied the doctrine to statutory time limits that are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Conclusion
The district court properly denied Seino’s petition for judicial review because her notice
of appeal was untimely and neither the doctrine of unique circumstances nor the doctrine of
equitable tolling saved Seino’s untimely appeal.
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